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THE DECAY OF PERSONAL RIGHTS
AND GUARANTEES'
Many civilizations which have entered the domain of history
seem to present two evolutionary periods. The first period is that
in which the individual seeks to safeguard himself against the
excesses of arbitrary power, by extorting guarantees from the
sovereign; the second is that in which these guarantees are
gradually surrendered to the collective power of the mass.
The process by which English civilization has been, and is
being developed, seems to establish the fact that the first of these
-periods has been concluded, and that the second has begun.
In the first of these periods the political instinct which the
English people possess in so eminent a degree, busied itself with
asserting and maintaining the rights of men. It is now a serious
question, whether we are not more concerned in regulating their
activities. Up to recent times this people were unalterably com-
mitted to the maintenance of certain rights which they con-
sidered fundamental, and without which they did not believe that
liberty could permanently exist.
Among these rights, may be grouped the writ of habeas cor-
pus, trial by jury, once in jeopardy, religious freedom, peaceable
assemblage, a flee press, free speech, and for every man due
process of law.
Due process of law means that as to every matter which con-
cerns a man's personal or property rights he must have his day
in Court, and this Court must not be a thing merely named a
Court, but must possess the essential attributes of a judicial
tribunal.
That there is an ebb tide from these doctrines flowing swiftly
at this time is apparent to the careful observer.
Several causes for this reaction may be differentiated. The
energy of individualism in a virile race uncontrolled by tyranny,
inevitably produces a populous civilization and therefore a
complex one.
Each stage of this civilization produces a readjustment between
the rights of the individual and the rights of society. Thus, in
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every highly complex civilization, the individual right must, in
innumerable cases, be subordinated to the collective right, and
men thus gain as members of society what they lose as
individuals.
In a society like ours, each unit is affected in a thousand ways
by the activity of other units, and the more numerous the popu-
lation, and the greater its activities, the more the individual must
give up and the more the community acquires. There are other
causes which are based less upon natural law, and more upon
the infirmity of human nature. Among these is the growing
tendency to regard the rights of property owners as superior to
the rights of man, and to subordinate the individual to a social
system which recognizes the attainment of wealth as the most
desirable achievement of a prosperous society.
But, perhaps, the most potent because the most furtive solvent
of personal rights is to be found in the immense mass of admin-
istrative law which in both State and Nation is absorbing the
functions of government. Executive discretion is gradually in
many directions emancipating itself from judicial control, and
executive bodies are now frequently clothed with both judicial
and legislative functions.
Whatever causes we may choose to assign, the decay of per-
sonal rights and guarantees is so universal, its manifestations are
so numerous, it characterizes so many govermental activities,
State and National, that it may rise to the dignity of and evolu-
tionary process.
We find on every hand this reaction against individual rights
controlling the opinions of men, the acts of legislatures, the in-
terpretation of Courts and the declaration of political parties.
In certain directions, individualism is making a struggle for its
life. The press, the hustings, the Lav Courts resound with the
din of battle.
Nowhere is the conflict of these mighty social forces more
dramatically or more energetically waged than on the bench of
the Supreme Court of the United States.
In this arena, under the eyes of the Nation, rime intellectual
gladiators are struggling, some defending with precedent and
logic the ancient guarantees, others by arguments of impolicy
and inconvenience seem to be breaking over the barriers of con-
stitutional limitation.
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Wherever the strongholds of guaranteed rights are assailed
strong dissentient voices arise from the bench, and as these
strongholds fall one after another, as many have fallen, we find
dissenting opinions expressing regret and forebodings.
The growth of administrative law is not peculiar to the Federal
Government. Much attention has been focussed upon Federal
Court and the Federal Legislature in connection with centraliza-
tion of power, yet precisely the same influences are at work in
the State Government. Commission after commission is being
created, many of them with powerful and anomalous functions.
For instance, the Virginia Constitution of i9o2, has largely sub-
jected that State to a bureaucratic government.
This Constitution created a State Corporation Commission, and
conferred upon it legislative, administration and judicial powers,
all to be exercised in the same proceedings and as to the same
subject matter. A Board of Education was created, whose rules
have the force of legislative enactment and whose acts are beyond
the control of any other department of government.
Cities are demanding to be governed by commissions, and be-
cause of the popular zeal for quick results Congress and legis-
latures are creating special bureaus to deal with almost every
phase of human activity.
The Courts have recognized the doctrine of executive inde-
pendence where there is any discretion whatever, and this prin-
ciple of law has been stretched until it now includes the power to
pass upon rights which should demand a judicial investigation.
The Federal executive departments exercise vast and generally
uncontrolled power.
The Postoffice Department exercises a censorship) of the press
which, in its discretion, can be made more severe than that of
Russia.
By issuing what is known as a fraud order, any man's mail
can be stopped, and any publication suspended, and the victim
has no practical recourse.
The President of the United States has it in his power to deny
a whole community postal facilities, as was done in the case of
Indianola. Immigration official s have the uncontrolled power
to banish any citizen of the United States who, having left this
country. desires to come back. The case of Mitchell 7'. Clark.2
2 1 U. S.. 633.
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presents a striking illustration of the omnipotence with which
executive authority may be clothed. The Court in this case
upheld the fourth section of the Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat.,
which is as follows:
"That any order of the President, or under his authority, made
at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, shall be
a defense in all Courts to any action or prosecution, civil or
criminal, pending or to be commenced, for any search, seizure,
arrest or imprisonment, made, done or committed, or acts omitted
to be done under and by virtue of such order, or under color of
any law of Congress, and such defense may be made by special
plea or under the general issue."
The Court found a justification of this statute not in any power
delegated by the Constitution, but in the general power of a
government to indemnify its administrative officials.
In Hartrabnt's Appeal,3 it was held that neither the Governor
nor any of his subordinates are amendable to court processes as
to any matter pertaining to the duties of his office. This case
arose from a clash between the State militia and certain strikers
in which a number of persons were killed. The local Court com-
mitted the matter to a grand jury for investigation, and the
grand jury subpoenaed the Governor and a number of militia
officers to appear and give evidence, which they refused to do.
An interesting case, as marking the advance of administrative
usurpation, is the case of Ju Toy.4
Ju Toy was a Chinaman, born in this country, and therefore
not subject to the Chinese Exclusion Act.
Ju Toy paid a visit to China, and on his return to San Fran-
cisco, he was ordered to be deported by the immigration officials.
Thereupon, he sued out a writ of haebas corpus from a Federal
District Judge. In this Court it was upon evidence judicially
established, that Ju Toy was a native American, and his release
was ordered. From this judgment the Government appealed and
the case was heard by the Supreme Court.
A majority of the Court held, Justice Holmes delivering the
opinion, that even if Ju Toy was a native American, he could get
no relief from the order of deportation, because the finding of
the immigration officials was conclusive, and not subject to judi-
3 85 Pa. St., 433.
4 i98 U. S., 253.
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cial review. Justices Brewer, Peckham, and Day dissenting.
Judge Brewer in the dissenting opinion, said:
"It will be borne in mind that the petitioner has been judicially
determined to be a free-born American citizen, and the con-
tention of the Government sustained by the judgment of this
Court, is that a citizen guilty of no crime, for it is no crime for
a citizen to come back to his native land, must by the action of
a ministerial officer be punished by deportation and banishment,
without a trial by jury, and without judicial examination. Such
a decision is to my mind appalling. By all the authorities, the
banishment of a citizen is punishment, and punishment of the
severest kind."
A conspicuous foil to this case is the case of Miller v. Horton,5
in which the opinion was also delivered by Judge Holmes. In
this case it appears that the Massachusetts State Commissioners
on Contagious Diseases decided that the plaintiff's horse had the
glanders, and ordered him shot. Here the Court held that it
would go behind the finding of the Commissioners, and if it
appeared that the horse was not in fact afflicted with glanders,
the plaintiff had his action for damages against the Commis-
sioners.
It is, perhaps, in the insular cases that we find the greatest
divergence from the ancient landmarks. Whether controlled by
the instinct which in societies seems to accompany a natural law
of evolution, or whether controlled by more conscious motives,
our Courts by arguments of impolicy or inconvenience, are in
fundamental matters changing the force and meaning of written
law.
This fact is well illustrated by the case of Hawaii v. Mankichi,6
decided in 1903.
Hawaii was annexed to the United States by virtue of the
Newland's Resolution, which provided, among other things, that
until changed by Congress, the municipal laws of Hawaii should
govern where such laws were "not-contrary to the Constitution
of the United States." After the annexation, Mankichi was tried
for manslaughter upon an information and was found guilty by
the verdict of nine out of twelve jurors. Mankichi pled that
such procedure was contrary to Articles 5 and 6 of the Amend-
5 152 Mass., 540.
a 190 U. S., 197.
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inents, in that he could not be put upon trial except by indictment,
nor convicted except upon the unanimous verdict of twelve jurors.
A majority of the Court held that Mankichi was not entitled to
these Constitutional guarantees.
The majority opinions seem to be based upon two propositions:
(i) That only so much of the Constitution as was specifically
legislated by Congress into the Government of Hawaii prevailed
there; (2) that though the Constitution of its own vigor applied to
Hawaii upon annexation, nevertheless, only such provisions of
the Constitution as were locally applicable could be considered
the law of the land.
Justices Brown, Holmes, and Day seem to plant themselves
upon the first proposition, and Justices McKenna and White upon
the second.
Chief Justice Fuller, Justice Harland, Justice Brewer, and Jus-
tice Peckham dissented.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Judge Harlan says:
"Nevertheless, it is contended that the Constitutional provis-
ions in question are not fundamental in their nature, that whether
a person charged, for instance, with murder, shall be convicted
and hung pursuant to a verdict rendered by a majority of the
petit jury rather than all the jurors, is only 'a method of pro-
cedure.' My judgment refuses assent to this doctrine. I believe
it to be most mischievous in every respect. The provisions as
to grand and petit jurors are in the Constitution, and the man-
datory character of that instrument ought not to be disregarded.
What tribunal deriving its authority from the United States can
rightfully hold them to be immaterial? Whether these provisions
are fundamental in their nature or not, no Federal civil tribunal,
existing under the Constitution and under a solemn obligation
to maintain and defend it, can properly or safely ignore them. If
the local law under which Mankicbi was tried and convicted was
contrary to any provision of the Constitution, that instrument
should have been respected, whatever the nature of such pro-
vision."
This case overruled Webster v. Reid; 7 American Publishing
Co. v. Fisher; 7 Springfield v. Thomas; 7 and Thompson v. Utah,T
all of which decided that the right of trial by a constitutional
jury applied to all territories of the United States, and that Con-
' ii Howard, 437; i66 U. S., 464-468; 166 U. S., 707; 170 U. S., 243.
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gress could not deny this right nor permit it to be denied by terri-
torial legislation.
The case of Thompson v. Utah was decided as late as April,
1898, and this case held, that a statute of the State of Utah, pro-
viding for the trial of criminal cases other than capital, by a
jury of eight, was invalid as applied on the trial of a crime com-
mitted before Utah was admitted into the Union; that it was
not competent for the State of Utah, upon its admission into
the Union, to do in respect of Thompson's crime what the United
States could not have done, and that an Act of Congress provid-
ing for a trial by jury of less than twelve, would have been in
conflict with the Constitution.
The Thompson case and the Mankichi case measure the dis-
tance which the Supreme Court has in five years traveled to-
wards the denaturizing of the guarantees of the Constitution.
In the case of Trono v. United States," the facts were these:
Trono was proceeded against without indictment or jury in the
Court of the First Instance of the province of Bulacan, Philippine
Islands. for murder in the first degree. He was acquitted of the
crime of murder of any degree, but was convicted of assault, sen-
tenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine to the family
of the dead man.
Trono appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Is-
lands, which reversed the lower court and convicted Trono of
murder in -the second degree, and sentenced him to fourteen
years, eight months and one day imprisonment, and an indemnity
to the heirs of the deceased. The majority of the Stipreme Court
of the United States held that Trono was neither entitled to the
benefit of the jeopardy clause of the Constitution, nor to a trial
by jury, and affirmed the Supreme Court of the Philippine Is-
lands. Chief Justice Fuller, McKenna, White, and Harlan dis-
sented.
In the case of De Lina v. Bidwell ' the majority of the Court
held, that with the ratification of the- treaty between the United
States and Spain, April ii, 1899. the Island of Porto Rico ceased
to be a foreign country within the meaning of the tariff law.
This case was followed on the same (lay by the decision in
8 I99 U. S.. 52T.
1 82 U. S.. p. i.
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Dooley v. United States,"0 to the effect that "as the right to exact
duties upon importation from Porto Rico ceased with the ratifica-
tion of the treaty of peace, the correlative right to exact duties
upon imports from New York to Porto Rico also ceased at the
same time."
On the same day the Supreme Court decided the case of
Downes v. Bidwell."
In this case the majority of the Court, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer,
and Peckham, dissenting, held that Porto Rico, which under the
De Lima decision, had ceased to be foreign territory in respect to
the tariff laws, became again on the 12th of April, I9oo, foreign
territory as to that provision of the Constitution, which declares
that "all duties, imports and excises, shall be uniform through-
out the United States," being made such foreign territory as to
taxation by an Act of Congress, of the latter date, imposing
tariff duties on Porto Rico products, imported into the United
States. The Court decided on the general lines of the Mankichi
case, the majority holding either that the Constitution did not
govern unless so willed by Congress, or if it did govern it, was not
in force as to such provisions not deemed fundamental, or were
not, in the opinion of the Court, applicable to the conditions
existing in the Island.
In opposition to this reasoning the dissenters quote Judge
Cooley, as follows: "The Constitution itself never yields to
treaty or enactment; it neither changes with time nor does it in
theory bow to the force of circumstances. It may be amended
according to its own permission, but while it stands, it is a law
for rulers and people. Equally in war and in peace, it covers with
the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and
under all circumstances. Its principles cannot, therefore, be set
aside, in order to meet the supposed necessities of a great crisis.
No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever in-
vented by the wit of man, than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government."
Judge Harlan, in a separate dissenting opinion, says:
"I take leave to say that if the principles thus announced should
ever receive the sanction of a majority of this Court, a radical
and mischievous change in our system of government will be the
10 182 U. S., 222.
21 182 U. S., 244.
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result. We will, in that event, pass from an era of constitutional
liberty, guarded and protected by a written constitution, into an
era of absolutism."
And further: "Again, it is said that Congress has assumed in
its past history, that the Constitution goes into territories acquired
by purchase or conquest only when and as it shall so direct. This
is a view of the Constitution which may well cause surprise as
well as alarm. Congress, as I have observed, has no existence
except by virtue of the Constitution. It has no power which that
instrument has not granted, expressly or by necessary implica-
tion. I confess that I cannot grasp the thought that Congress,
which lives and moves and has its being in the Constitution, and
is consequently the mere creature of that instrument, can at its
pleasure, legislate or exclude its creator from territories which
were acquired only by the authority of the Constitution."
Dorr v. United States "I decided that Congress could deny to
the citizens of the Philippine Islands the right of trial by jury,
and follows the reasoning of the Mankichi case.
Out of the entangled, perplexed and often inconsistent argu-
ment of the majority justices in these insular cases, two wholly
new principles of constitutional law seem to emerge.
One is that the Constitution does not inherently and of its own
vigor apply to territories of the United States, and does not be-
come operative in such territories except and until it is made
operative by an Act of Congress, and in such cases only so much
of the Constitution as the Act itself directs shall govern. The
other is that some provisions of the Constitution are fundamental
and mandatory, and others are matters of procedure, which need
not be regarded if their enforcement would seem impolitic or
inconvenient.
If the Constitution can only be carried into territories of the
United States by an Act of Congress, then the Constitution has
no other sanction than the Act itself, and it is carried not as the
Constitution, but as the will of Congress.
Therefore, an Act of Congress can repeal the rights which the
Act created, and the people of such territories can only have a
legislative recognition for such rights as they are allowed to
possess, and these rights may be taken away by the same power
that gave them.
127J95 U. S., 138.
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If some provisions of the Constitution are fundamental and
binding and others are not, it follows that the Court must ascer-
tain what provisions are binding and what are not. The validity
and obligation of any part of the Constitution at any given time
must depend upon the opinion of a majority of the nine judges
composing the Supreme Court of the United States.
In five years we have seen Constitutional guarantees for a
hundred years deemed impregnable, crumble in the hands of the
Court. We are told that the writ of habeas corpus, the right to
trial by jury, the exemption from prosecution for a felony save
by the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, the mandate
for uniform tariffs and excises are not of the essence of rights;
but in their application to be controlled by policy and con-
venience.
It cannot be denied that these insular decisions have opened
the door wide to the doctrine of amendment by interpretation,
and that since these decisions it cannot be said that the Constitu-
tion is inviolate in its written provisions.
If the Court does not recede from these principles of construc-
tion, the supreme law of the land will not be the Constitution of
the United States, but the will of nine elder statesmen sitting in
judgment over the Federal and State Legislatures and giving
judgment not in accordance with written law, but upon some
theory of statecraft. In other words, the Court will become the
legislature of the last resort.
The-decay of our guaranteed personal rights means the death
of individualism and the tyranny of infinitely complex laws, con-
sisting of administrative rules, legislative requirements and judi-
cial decisions, subject to constant adjustment to meet supposed
political or social necessities.
This condition will bring about a profound change in our
system of government, but the change, I think, will not be for
the better.
The unhappy condition of the State of Colorado is an example
of the anarchy which may ensue where the constitutional guar-
antees are not respected by the executive or enforced by the
Courts.
In that State not long ago, the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended, trial by jury was denied, men were imprisoned without
accusation and deported without authority. The Supreme Bench
constituted itself a returning board, and established by a so-
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called high prerogative writ its power over elections. A military
and judicial autocracy banished every semblance of constitutional
government.
This lesson should be carefully studied. Human freedom is not
a gift to man; it is an achievement by man, and, as it was gained
by vigilance and struggle, so it may be lost by indifference and
supineness. Richard Evelyn Byrd.
